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THE  FOLK  THEOREM  IN  REPEATED  GAMES  WITH 
DISCOUNTING  OR  WITH  INCOMPLETE  INFORMATION1 
BY  DREW  FUDENBERG  AND  ERIC  MASKIN2 
When either there are only two players or a "full dimensionality" condition holds, any 
individually rational payoff vector of a one-shot game of complete information can arise 
in a perfect equilibrium of the infinitely-repeated game if players are sufficiently patient. 
In contrast to earlier work, mixed strategies are allowed  in determining the individually 
rational payoffs (even when only realized actions are observable). Any individually rational 
payoffs of a one-shot  game can be approximated by sequential equilibrium payoffs of a 
long but finite game of incomplete information, where players' payoffs are almost certainly 
as in the one-shot game. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
THAT  STRATEGIC  RIVALRY  in a long-term relationship may differ from that of a 
one-shot game is by now quite a familiar idea. Repeated play allows players to 
respond to each other's actions, and so each player must consider the reactions 
of his opponents  in making his decision. The fear of retaliation may thus lead 
to outcomes that otherwise would not occur. The most dramatic expression of 
this  phenomenon  is  the  celebrated  "Folk  Theorem" for  repeated  games.  An 
outcome that Pareto dominates the minimax point is called individually rational. 
The Folk Theorem asserts that any individually rational outcome can arise as a 
Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games with sufficiently little discounting. 
As Aumann and Shapley [3] and Rubinstein [20] have shown, the same result 
is true when we replace the word "Nash" by "(subgame) perfect" and assume 
no discounting at all. 
Because the Aumann-Shapley/Rubinstein  result supposes literally no discount- 
ing, one may wonder whether the exact counterpart of the Folk Theorem holds 
for perfect equilibrium, i.e., whether as the discount factor tends to one, the set 
of perfect equilibrium outcomes converges to the individually rational set. After 
all, agents in most games of  economic  interest are not completely patient; the 
no discounting case is of interest as an approximation. 
It turns out that this counterpart is false. There can be a discontinuity (formally, 
a failure of lower hemicontinuity) where the discount factor, 8, equals one,  as 
we show in Example 3. Nonetheless  the games in which discontinuities  occur 
are quite degenerate, and, in the end, we  can give a qualified "yes" (Theorem 
2)  to  the  question  of  whether the  Folk  Theorem  holds  with  discounting.  In 
particular, it  always holds  in two-player games  (Theorem  1). This last  result 
contrasts with the recent work of Radner-Myerson-Maskin  [18]  showing that, 
even in two-player games, the equilibrium set may not be continuous at 8 = 1 in 
1 Under stronger hypotheses, we obtain a sharper characterization of perfect and Nash equilibrium 
payoffs of discounted repeated games in our note (Fudenberg and Maskin [8]). 
2 We wish to thank D. Abreu, R. Aumann, D. Kreps, M. Whinston, and three referees for helpful 
comments. The project was inspired by conversations with P. Milgrom. We are grateful to NSF Grants 
SES 8409877 and SES 8320334 and the Sloan Foundation for financial support. 
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the discount factor if players' moves are not directly observable and outcomes 
depend stochastically on moves. 
Until recently, the study of perfect equilibrium in repeated games concentrated 
mainly  on  infinite repetitions without  discounting  ("supergames"). One  early 
exception  was Friedman [5 and 6], who showed that any outcome that Pareto 
dominates a Nash equilibrium of the constituent game (the game being repeated) 
can be supported in a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game.3 The repeated 
game strategies he specified are particularly simple: after any deviation from the 
actions that sustain the  desired outcome,  players revert to the  one-shot  Nash 
equilibrium for the remainder of the game. More recently, Abreu [1] established 
that a highly restricted set of strategies suffices to sustain any perfect equilibrium 
outcome. Specifically, whenever any player deviates from the desired equilibrium 
path, that player can be "punished" by players' switching to the worst possible 
equilibrium for the deviator regardless of the history of the game to that point. 
We exploit this idea of history-free punishments, by contrast with the methods 
of Aumann-Shapley/Rubinstein,  in the proofs of our Theorems 1 and 2, which 
are constructive.4 In the  proof  of  the two-person  "discounting  folk  theorem" 
(Theorem 1), both players switch for a specified number of periods to strategies 
that minimize their opponent's  maximum payoff (i.e., minimax strategies) after 
any deviation. Theorem 2 treats the n-person case, where "mutual minimaxing" 
may be impossible.  In this case we impose  a "full dimensionality" assumption 
that enables players to be rewarded for having carried out punishments. Theorem 
5 also makes use of rewards to punishers to show that mixed strategies can be 
used as punishments even if only realized actions, and not the mixed strategies 
themselves, are observable. This provides a substantially stronger result, because 
the individually rational payoff levels are often lower with mixed strategies than 
with pure ones. 
Although  the  theory  of  infinitely  repeated  games  offers an  explanation  of 
cooperation in ongoing relationships, economic  agents often have finite lives. If 
the game has a long but finite length, the set of equilibria may be much smaller 
than the folk theorem would  suggest. The classic example here is the repeated 
prisoner's dilemma: with a fixed finite horizon the only equilibrium involves both 
players' confessing  every period,  in contrast with the cooperative  equilibrium 
that is  sustainable  with  an infinite horizon.5 Still anecdotal  and  experimental 
evidence both suggest that cooperation is a likely outcome with a large but finite 
number of repetitions. 
Recently  Kreps-Wilson  [14],  Milgrom-Roberts  [17],  and  Kreps-Milgrom- 
Roberts-Wilson  [13] have proposed a reason why a finite number of repetitions 
might allow cooperation. Their explanation supposes that players are uncertain 
about  the  payoffs  or  possible  actions  of  their  opponents.  Such  "incomplete 
3 Actually Friedman was concerned explicitly only with Nash equilibria of the repeated game. The 
strategies that he proposed, however, constitute perfect equilibria (See Theorem C of Section 2). 
4 Lockwood [16] characterizes the (smaller set of) equilibrium payoffs that are possible when one 
restricts attention to punishments of the Aumann-Shapley/Rubinstein  variety. 
5 See,  however,  Benoit  and  Krishna [4]  and  Friedman [7]  who  show  that when  a game with 
multiple equilibria is repeated even only finitely many times, "Folk-Theorem-like" results may emerge. FOLK  THEOREM  535 
information" in the prisoner's dilemma precludes applying the backwards-induc- 
tion argument that establishes that the players must confess each period. Players 
can credibly threaten to take suboptimal actions if there is some (small) probability 
that the action is indeed optimal, because they have an interest in maintaining 
their reputation for possible  "irrationality." 
The  examples  of  reputation  games  analyzed  to  date  exhibit  the  apparent 
advantage, compared with infinite-horizon models, of having substantially smaller 
sets of equilibria. However, the equilibrium set depends on the precise form of 
irrationality specified. Our "incomplete information" Folk Theorem shows that 
by varying the kind of irrationality specified, but still keeping the probability of 
irrationality arbitrarily small, one can trace out the entire set of infinite-horizon 
equilibria. Thus, in a formal sense, the two approaches, infinite and finite horizon, 
yield the same results. However, those who are willing to choose among different 
forms of irrationality may still find the incomplete information approach useful. 
One  may  argue for  or  against certain equilibria  on  the  basis  of  the  type  of 
irrationality needed to support them. 
We provide two different theorems for repeated games of incomplete informa- 
tion. Our first result (Theorem 3) parallels Friedman's work on repeated games 
with  discounting:  after  a  deviation  the  "crazy" player  switches  to  a  Nash- 
equilibrium strategy of the constituent game. This simple form of  irrationality 
suffices to support any outcome that Pareto-dominates a,(one-shot)  Nash equili- 
brium. Our second, and main, result (Theorem 4) uses a more complex form of 
irrationality. However, the basic approach is the same as in our Folk Theorem 
with discounting: after a deviation each player switches to his minimax strategy 
for a specified number of periods. 
It is not surprising that similar kinds of arguments should apply to both infinite 
horizon games with discounting  and finite horizon games. Each type of  game 
entails the difficulty, not present in infinite horizon games without discounting, 
that deviators from the equilibrium path cannot be "punished" arbitrarily  severely. 
This limitation is a problem because of the requirement of perfection. Deviators 
must be punished, but it must also be in the interest of the punishers to punish. 
That is, they must themselves be threatened with punishment if they fail to punish 
a deviator. Such  considerations  give  rise to  an infinite sequence  of  potential 
punishments that, at each level, enforce the punishments of the previous level. 
Depending  on how these punishments are arranged, they may have to become 
increasingly severe the farther out in the sequence they lie. This creates no problem 
in supergames but may be impossible for the two types of games that we consider. 
It seems natural, therefore, to study these two types together. 
Section 2 presents the classical Folk Theorem and the Aumann-Shapley/ Rubin- 
stein and Friedman variants. Section 3 discusses  continuity of the equilibrium 
correspondence as a function of the discount factor and develops Folk Theorems 
for infinitely repeated games with discounting. Section 4 provides a simple proof 
that any payoffs that Pareto dominate  a  (one-shot)  Nash  equilibrium can be 
sustained in an equilibrium of a finitely repeated game with incomplete informa- 
tion. This result is the analog of the Friedman [5] result. Section 5 uses a more 
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Sections  2-5  follow  previous work on  repeated games  in  assuming that, if 
mixed  strategies are used  as punishments, they  are themselves  observable. In 
Section 6 we drop this assumption but show that our results continue to hold 
under the more natural hypothesis that players can observe only  each other's 
past actions. 
2.  THE  CLASSICAL  FOLK  THEOREM 
Consider a finite n-person game in normal form 
g:  Al  x  ...  x  An  --  Rn 
For now, we shall not distinguish between pure and mixed strategies, and so we 
might as well  suppose  that the Ai's consist  of  mixed  strategies. Thus, we  are 
assuming either that a player can observe the others' past mixed strategies, as in 
previous work on repeated games, or restricting players to pure strategies. Mixed 
strategies can be made observable if the outcomes of players' randomizing devices 
are jointly observable ex-post. (More importantly, we show in Section 6 that the 
assumption is not necessary.)  Moreover, for convenience,  we  assume that the 
players can make their actions contingent on the outcome of a public randomizing 
device. That is, they can play correlated strategies.6 Even if a correlated strategy 
over vectors of actions cannot literally be adopted, it can still be approximated 
if the action vectors are played successively over time and the frequency of any 
given vector corresponds to its probability in the correlated strategy. To see how 
to modify the statements of the theorems if correlated strategies cannot be used, 
see the Remark following  Theorem A. 
For each j, choose  Mi = (Mi,  . . .,  MJn)  so that 
(M1,  ...  *,  Mi_1,  Mi+1,  ...  .  MJn)  c arg min  max gj(aj,  asj), 
a-j  aj 
and 
v=*  max  gj(aj, Mi)  = gj(Mi).7 
a. 
The strategies (Mi,  ... .,  M,_1, m_+19  ...,  MJn)  are minimax strategies (which 
may not be unique) against playerj,  and v0 is the smallest payoff that the other 
players can keep player j below.8 We will call vj player j's reservation value and 
refer to  (v*,...,  v*)  as the minimax point. Clearly, in any equilibrium of g- 
whether or not g is repeated-player  j's expected average payoff must be at least 
Vj*. 
6 See Aumann [2]. More generally, a correlated strategy might entail having each player make his 
action contingent on a (private) signal correlated with some randomizing device. We shall, however, 
ignore this possibility. 
7The  notation  "a_j"  denotes  '"(a1,...,a  a  .1aj+.  an)",  and  "gj(a3, M'j)"  denotes 
gj(Mj,.  ..,  Mj-l,  aj, Mj+, *.*,  Mj). 
8Actually,  if n : 3, the other players may be able to keep player j's  payoff even lower by using a 
correlated strategy against j, where the outcome of the correlating device is not observed by j (another 
way  of  putting  this  is  to  observe  that,  for  n > 3,  the  inequality  maxa, mina, gj(aj, a-,)  S 
minaj  maxa,  gj(aj, a-j)  can hold strictly). In keeping with the rest of the literature on repeated games, 
however, we shall rule out such correlated strategies. FOLK  THEOREM 
Henceforth we shall normalize the payoffs of the game g so that (v*,...,  v*) = 
(0,...,0).  Let 
U={(vl  ,..  .,  n)|3(al,  .. ,  an)EAl1x  ..  xAn 
with  g(a1,  . ..,  an)  =  (v1,  . .,  Vn)}, 
V = Convex Hull of  U, 
and 
V* = {(Vi,...,  Vn)  Vvi  > 0 for  all  i}. 
The set V consists of feasible payoffs, and V* consists of feasible payoffs that 
Pareto dominate the minimax point. That is, V* is the set of individually rational 
payoffs.  In  a  repeated  version  of  g,  we  suppose  that  players  maximize  the 
discounted sum of single period payoffs. That is, if (a1(t),...,  an(t))  is the vector 
of actions played in period t and 8 is player i's discount factor, then his payoff 
is  Et  8t-lgi(al(t),...,  an(t))  and  his  average  payoff  is  (1- 
8)  EtZ1  t-gi(al(t),  ...,  an(t)). We can now state a version of the Folk Theorem 
(see Hart [10] for more details). 
THEOREM  A (The Folk Theorem):  For any (vl,...,  Vn)  E V*, ifplayers discount 
the  future sufficiently  little, there exists a Nash equilibrium  of the infinitely  repeated 
game where,  for all i, player i's average payoff is vi.9 
PROOF:  Let  (si,...,  Sn)  A1 x·  ·  X An  be  a  vector  of  strategies10  such  that 
g(,  . ..,  Sn) = (v1,...,  Vn). Suppose  that in the repeated  game  each player  i plays 
si until some player j  deviates from Sj (if more than one player deviates simul- 
taneously, we can suppose that the deviations are ignored). Thereafter, assume 
that he plays Mi. These strategies form a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game 
if there is not too  much discounting; any momentary gain that may accrue to 
player j  if he deviates from sj is swamped by the prospect of being minimaxed 
forever after.  Q.E.D. 
REMARK:  If we disallowed correlated strategies, the same proof would estab- 
lish that any positive vector in U could be enforced as an equilibrium. For other 
points (v1,...,  Vn)  in V* the statement of the theorem must be modified to read: 
for all  e > 0 there exists  _ < 1 such that, for all  8 > §, there exists  a subgame 
perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game in which each player i's average 
payoff is within e of vi, when players have discount factor 8. The e qualification 
is needed because  discounting and the requirement that each vector of actions 
be played  an integral number of  times limit the  accuracy of  approximating a 
correlated strategy by switching among action vectors over time. 
9 The hypothesis that the  vi's are positive is important, as a recent example by Forges, Mertens, 
and Neyman demonstrates. 
10  Or, if necessary, correlated strategies. 
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Of course, the strategies of Theorem A do not, in general, form a (subgame) 
perfect equilibrium (such an equilibrium is a configuration of strategies that form 
a Nash equilibrium in all subgames), because, if a player deviates, it may not be 
in others' interest to go through with the punishment of minimaxing him forever. 
However, Aumann and Shapley [3] and Rubinstein [20] showed that, when there 
is no discounting, the counterpart of Theorem A holds for perfect equilibrium. 
THEOREM  B (Aumann-Shapley/Rubinstein):  For any (vI,  .. .  vn) C  V* there 
exists a perfect equilibrium  in the infinitely  repeated  game with  no discounting,  where, 
for all i, player i's expected  payoff each period is vi.11 
REMARK:  The Aumann-Shapley  and Rubinstein arguments assume that past 
mixed strategies are observable (or, alternatively, that only pure strategies are 
ever played, which, in general, implies a smaller equilibrium set). However, the 
methods of Section 6 can be used to establish Theorem B in the case where only 
past actions are observable. 
The idea  of the proof is simple to express. Once again, as long  as everyone 
has previously conformed, players continue to play their si's, leading to payoff 
vi. If some player j deviates, he is, as before, minimaxed but, rather than forever, 
only  long  enough  to  wipe  out  any possible  gain  that he  obtained  from this 
deviation. After this punishment, the players go back to their si's. To induce the 
punishers to  go  through with their minimaxing,  they  are threatened with the 
prospect that, if any one  of them deviates from his punishment strategy, he in 
turn will be minimaxed by the others long enough to make such a deviation not 
worthwhile. Moreover, his punishers will be punished if any one of them deviates, 
etc. Thus, there is a potential sequence of successively higher order punishments, 
where the punishment at each level is carried out for fear the punishment at the 
next level will be invoked. 
Theorem B is not  an exact counterpart of  Theorem A because  it allows no 
discounting at all (we investigate in Section 3 when an exact counterpart holds). 
Mioreover,  the strategies of the proof are a good deal more complex than those 
of Theorem A. One well-known  case that admits both discounting  and simple 
strategies is where the point to be sustained Pareto dominates the payoffs of a 
Nash equilibrium of the constituent game g. 
THEOREM  C (Friedman [5] and [6]):  If (vl,...a  vn)  c V* Pareto dominates the 
payoffs (Y1, ...  , Y)  of a  (one-shot)  Nash  equilibrium (el,.  . .,  en)  of g,  then, if 
players discount the  future sufficiently  little, there exists a perfect equilibrium  of the 
infinitely repeated game where,  for all i, player i's average payoff is vi. 
" If there is no discounting, the sum of single-period payoffs cannot serve as a player's repeated 
game payoff since the sum may not be defined. Aumann and Shapley use (the lim infinum of) the 
average payoff; Rubinstein considers both this and the overtaking criterion, and the sketch of the 
proof we offer corresponds to this latter rule. (See also Hart [10]). The average payoff criterion allows 
more outcomes to be supported as equilibria than the overtaking criterion because  for a player to 
strictly prefer to  deviate he must gain in infinitely many periods.  Indeedc,  for the former criterion, 
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PROOF: Suppose  that  players  play  actions  that  sustain  (v1,...,  vj)  until 
someone  deviates,  after which they play  (e1,.  . .,  en) forever. With sufficiently 
little discounting, this behavior constitutes a perfect equilibrium.  Q.E.D. 
Because  the  punishments  used  in Theorem C are less  severe than those  in 
Theorems  A  and  B,  its  conclusion  is  correspondingly  weaker.  For  example, 
Theorem C does  not allow  us to conclude  that a Stackelberg outcome  can be 
supported as an equilibrium in an infinitely-repeated quantity-setting duopoly. 
3.  THE  FOLK  THEOREM  IN  INFINITELY  REPEATED  GAMES  WITH  DISCOUNTING 
We now turn to the question of whether Theorem A holds for perfect rather 
than  Nash  equilibrium.  Technically  speaking,  we  are investigating the  lower 
hemicontinuity12 of the perfect equilibrium average payoff correspondence (where 
the independent variable is the discount factor, 8) at 8 = 1. We first remind the 
reader that this correspondence is upper hemicontinuous.3 
THEOREM D:  Let V(8) = {(vl,  .  . .,  vn)  c V*I(vi, .. .,  vn) are the average  payoffs 
of a perfect equilibrium  of the infinitely  repeated game where  players have discount 
factor 8}.  The correspondence  V(*)  is upper  hemicontinuous  at any 8 < 1. 
It is easy to give examples where V( - ) fails to be lower hemicontinuous at 8 < 1. 
EXAMPLE 1: Consider the following version of the Prisoner's Dilemma: 
C  D 
C  1,1  -1,2 
D  2,  1  0,0 
For  8<1/2  there are no  equilibria of  the  repeated game  other than players' 
choosing -D every period. However at 8 = 1/2 many additional equilibria appear, 
including playing  C each period until someone  deviates and thereafter playing 
D. Thus V(Q) is not lower hemicontinuous at 8 = 1/2. 
3A.  Two-Player  Games 
Our particular concern, however, is the issue of lower hemicontinuity at 8 = 1, 
and we begin  with two-player games. It turns out that, in this case, the exact 
analog of Theorem A holds for perfect equilibrium. We should point out, however, 
12 A correspondencef:  X -e  Y is lower hemicontinuous at x = x if for any y ef(x)  and any sequence 
x  e  x there e'xists a sequence ym e  y  such that ym Gf(xm)  for all m. 
13 If Y is compact the correspondence f:  X -e  Y is upper hemicontinuous at x if for any sequence 
x  e  x  and any sequence ym e  -  such that ym ef(xm)  for all m, we have y  5f(x). D.  FUDENBERG  AND  E.  MASKIN 
that to  establish  this  analog  we  cannot use  the  Aumann-Shapley/Rubinstein 
(AS/R)  strategies of Theorem B once there is discounting. To see that, if there 
is discounting, such strategies may not be able to sustain all individually rational 
points, consider the following  example. 
EXAMPLE  2: 
C  D 
C  1,1  0,-2 
D  -2,  0  -1,-1 
For this game the minimax point is (0, 0), and so a "folk theorem" would require 
that we be able to sustain, in particular, strategies that choose  (C, C)  a fraction 
(e + 1)/2  of the time and (D, D)  the remainder of the time, with 0 <  < 1 (note 
that for 8 near 1, these strategies yield average payoffs of approximately (e, e), 
which are individually rational). However such behavior cannot be part of an 
AS/R  type of equilibrium.14  Suppose, for example, that one of the players (say, 
player I) played  C in a period where he was supposed to play D. In an AS/R 
equilibrium, player II would "punish" I by playing D  sufficiently long to make 
I's deviation unprofitable. I's immediate gain from deviation is  1, and I's best 
response to D  is C, resulting in a payoff 0. Therefore if the punishment lasts for 
t, periods,  t, must satisfy 
8S(1-  St')  >  l  >1+t  ~0=1.  1-8 
That is, 
log(8  -1+  8) 
(1)  tl>  8  o 
log 8 
Condition (1) can be satisfied as long as 
(2)  8>  -.  l+E 
14 
Although  Rubinstein's [19] theorem applies to stationary strategies without public correlation 
(and so does  not directly imply that (e, e)  can be enforced without discounting)  it does  permit a 
continuum of strategies. Thus we can think of an "enlarged" version of this game, with a continuum 
of strategies indexed by e, 0 < e < 1, as well as the original strategies C and D. Suppose that if both 
players play e, they each receive e. If one plays e and the other plays  ',  they each get 1/2.  If player 
2 plays e and 1 plays C, 1 receives 1 + e and 2 receives 0. If 2 plays e and 1 plays D,  1 gets -1  + e 
and 2 gets e. The payoffs are permuted if the roles are reversed. In this enlarged game, D is still the 
minimax strategy and (0, 0) is the minimax point. Hence, the pure strategy pair (e, e) is sustainable 
by AS/R  punishments without discounting, but, as we show in the text, these punishments fail in 
the discounting case. 
540 FOLK  THEOREM 
But in  order to  punish  player I,  II must himself  suffer a payoff of  -2  for  t1 
periods. To induce him to submit to such self-laceration, he must be threatened 
with a t2-period punishment, where 
-2  (1  8t') + 8'  (1  8-  ')  > 1. 
1-8  1-8 
That is, 
(3)  t2  >-1+log  8  3+28+  log 8. 
Such a t2 exists as long as 
8'1E  -3+2'1+  > 0, 
which requires that 
/  2  V /1 
(4)  8>  2 
But (4) is a more stringent requirement than (2), since 
1 
(2/(2 +  ))1/  t > 
Continuing iteratively, we find that, for successively higher order punishments, 
8 is bounded below by a sequence of numbers converging to 1. Since 8 is itself 
strictly less than 1, however, this is an impossibility, and so an AS/R  equilibrium 
is impossible. 
The problem is that in this example the punisher is hurt more severely by his 
punishment than is his victim. He must therefore be threatened with an even 
stronger punishment.  Without discounting,  this  can be  arranged by  (roughly) 
taking the ti's to be a geometric series, as in Rubinstein [20]. With discounting, 
however, arbitrarily long punishments are not arbitrarily severe, because far-off 
punishments are relatively unimportant. 
These punishment strategies are not "simple" in the sense of Abreu [1] because 
they are not independent of history, i.e., they depend on the previous sequence 
of deviations. Abreu's work shows that there is no loss in restricting attention to 
simple punishments when players discount the future. Indeed, we make use of 
simple punishments in the proof of the following  result, which shows that we 
can do without arbitrarily severe punishments in the two-player case. 
THEOREM  1:  For  any  (Vl,  v2)  V*  there exists § E (0, 1)  such  that, for  all 
8 E (8, 1), there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium  of the infinitely  repeated  game 
in which  player i's average payoff is vi when players have discount  factor 8. 
PROOF:  Let  Ml  be  player  one's  minimax  strategy against  two,  and  M2 a 
minimax  strategy  against  one.  Take  -i  =maxa,a2  gi(al,  a2).  For  (vl,  v2)  V* 
choose  v and  8  such  that  for  i=  1, 2, 
(5)  vi>  vi(1-)  +  v**, 
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where 
(6)  **=  (1-  V)gi(Ml,  M2) +  -vVi, 
with 
(7)  v**>0. 
To see that v and 8 exist, choose  8 close enough to 1 so that 
(5a)  Vi  >  i(1 -  8) 
and (7) holds when v = 1. If with v = 1, (5) is violated, consider raising v. From 
(5a), (5) will eventually be satisfied. Since, for 8 close to 1, (6) declines almost 
continuously as v increases, by taking _ near enough to one we can ensure that 
(7) will be satisfied for the first v for which (5) holds. 
Condition (5) guarantees that player i prefers receiving vi forever to receiving 
his maximum possible payoff (vi) once, then receiving gi(Ml,  M2) for v periods, 
and receiving vi thereafter. Condition (7) ensures that being punished for deviating 
is still better than receiving the reservation value, zero, forever. Clearly, for any 
8>  _ there is a corresponding v(8)  such that (5) and (7) hold for (8, v(8)). 
Let  (s1,s2)  be  correlated  one-shot  strategies  corresponding  to  (v1, v2): 
gi(s,  s2) =  vi. Consider the following repeated game strategies for player i: 
(A)  Play si each period as long as (s1, s2) was played last period. 
After any deviation from (A): 
(B)  Play Miv(8) times and then start again with (A). If there are any deviations 
while in phase (B), then begin phase (B) again. 
These strategies form a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Condition (5) guarantees 
that deviation  is  not  profitable in phase  (A).  In phase  (B),  player  i  receives 
an  average  payoff  of  at  least  v**  by  not  deviating.  If  he  deviates,  he  can 
obtain  at  most  0  the  first period  (because  his  opponent,  j,  is  playing  Mj), 
and thereafter can  average at most  v**.  Hence  deviation  is  not  profitable in 
phase (B).  Q.E.D. 
The statement of Theorem 1 assumes that correlated strategies are available. 
To see how the theorem must be modified if they are not, see the remark  following 
Theorem A. 
The strategies in the proof of Theorem 1 are easily summarized. After a deviation 
by either player, each player minimaxes the other for a certain number of periods, 
after which they return to the original path. If a further deviation occurs during 
the punishment phase, the phase is begun again. 
Notice  that in the proof of Theorem 1 the only place where we invoked our 
assumption that past mixed  strategies can be  observed was in  supposing  that 
deviations  from  the  minimax  strategies,  M1 and  M2, can  be  detected.  This 
assumption is dropped in Section 6. 
3B.  Three or More Players 
The method  we used  to  establish Theorem  1-"mutual  minimaxing"-does 
not extend to three or more players. This is because with, say, three players there 
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may exist no triple of alternatives (M1, M2,  M3) such that M2 and M3 minimax 
player one,  M1 and M3 minimax two, and M1 and M2 minimax three; that is, 
the "mutual minimax" property may fail. However, the situation is even worse: 
not only does  the method  of proving Theorem 1 fail to  extend, but the result 
itself does not generalize. To see this, consider the following  example. 
EXAMPLE  3: 
1, 1, 1  0,0,0  0,0,0  0,0,0 
0,0,0  0,0,0  0,0,0  1,1,1 
In this game, player one chooses  rows, player two chooses  columns, and three, 
matrices. Note  that whatever one player gets, the others get too. 
CLAIM: For any 8 < 1 there does not exist a perfect equilibrium of the super- 
game in which the average payoff e is less than 1/4  (the one-shot mixed strategy 
equilibrium payoff). 
PROOF: For fixed 8 < 1,  let a = inf{ele  sustainable as an average payoff of a 
player in a perfect equilibrium}. We must show that a > 1/4.  Let 
/3 =  min  max  {g(r-l,  o-r2, r*),  g2(r*,  r2,  3*) 
1T,°02,03  O'1,'2,O'3 
g3(1*',  o2,  (3)}. 
That is,  /3 is the minimum that the most fortunate defector can obtain in an 
optimal (one-shot)  deviation from an arbitrary configuration of  strategies. We 
claim that /3  > 1/4.  Hence, the mutual minimax property does not hold. 
To see this, let ai be the probability that player i plays the "first"  pure strategy, 
i.e., the first column, row, or matrix as appropriate. For some player i it must be 
the case that, for j  1  i $  k, either aj > 1/2  and ak > 1/2  or aj < 1/2  and ak < 1/2. 
But since player i can obtain any convex combination of.ajak  and (1 -  aj)(1 -  ak) 
as a payoff, he can get a payoff of at least 1/4. 
Thus in any equilibrium, the payoff to  deviating for some player is at least 
1/4+  8a/(1  -  8).  Let  {em} be  a sequence  of  possible  average  payoffs  in  perfect 
equilibria, where Em  -> a. For all m we have 1/4+  8a/(1  -8)  <  /  Em/(1  -  8).  Hence, 
1/4+  8a/(1  -8)  a/(1-8  ),  and so a>  1/4.  Q.E.D. 
The game of  Example 3 is degenerate in the sense that  V*, the individually 
rational set, is one-dimensional.  This degeneracy is responsible for the discon- 
tinuity in  V(8)  as the next result demonstrates. 
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THEOREM  2:  Assume that the dimensionality of  V*  equals n, the number of 
players, i.e., that the interior of V (relative to n-dimensional space) is nonempty. 
Then,  for any (V1,...,  Vn) in V*, there exists 8 E (0, 1) such that for all 8 E (,  1) 
there exists  a  subgame-perfect equilibrium of  the infinitely repeated game  with 
discount  factor 8 in which  player i's average payoff is vi. 
The idea behind the proof of Theorem 2 is simple. If a player deviates, he is 
minimaxed  by  the  other players long  enough  to  wipe  out  any gain  from his 
deviation. To induce the other players to go through with minimaxing him, they 
are ultimately given a "reward" in the form of an additional "E" in their average 
payoff. The possibility of providing such a reward relies on the full dimensionality 
of the payoff set. 
PROOF:  Choose  s =  (s,...,  Sn)  so  that  g(s,  ...,  Sn)  =  (v1,..,  vn)  (again  we 
allow correlated strategies). Also choose  (vi,...,  v'n)  in the interior of  V* such 
that  vi>  v'  for  all  i. Since  (v,  ...,  v'n) is  in  the  interior  of  V*  and  V*  has  full 
dimension, there exists e > 0 so that, for each j, 
(VI+  ,...,  ·i-1+  E,  Vj,  j+1  +  E,  .  .  ,  Vn +  E) 
is in V*. Let T- = (T-,...,  T-n)  be a joint strategy that realizes these payoffs. Let 
MJ = (M-,...,  M-n)  be an n-tuple of strategies such that the strategies for players 
other than j together minimize playerj's maximum payoff, and such that gj(Mi) = 
0. Let wi = gi(Mi)  be player i's per-period payoff when minimaxing playerj. For 
each i choose  an integer vi such that 
(8)  <1+  vi,  vi 
where, as before,  iU,  is player i's greatest one-shot payoff. 
Consider the following  repeated game strategy for player i: 
(A)  play si each period as long as s was played last period. If playerj  deviates 
from  (A),15 then: 
(B)  play Mi  for vj periods, and then: 
(C)  play  T{ thereafter. 
If player k deviates in phase (B) or (C), then begin phase (B) again with j=  k.16 
If player i deviates in phase (A) and then conforms, he receives at most vi,  the 
period he deviates, zero for vi periods, and v' each period thereafter. His total 
payoff, therefore, is no greater than 
vi+l1 
(9)  V,+ --  vi.  1-8 
15 If several players deviate from (A) simultaneously, then we can just as well suppose that everyone 
ignores the deviation and continues to play s. 
16 As in footnote  15, we can suppose that simultaneous deviation by several players is ignored. 
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If he conforms throughout, he obtains vi/(l  -  8), so that the gain to deviating is 
less than 
1 _  8(vi+l) 
(10)  V,i-  Vi.  1-8 
Because  (1-8v+1)/(1-8)  converges to  vi+1  as  8  tends  to  1,  condition  (8) 
ensures that (10) is negative for all 8 larger than some 8 < 1. If player i deviates 
in phase (B) when he is being punished, he obtains at most zero the period in 
which  he  deviates,  and  then  only  lengthens  his  punishment,  postponing  the 
positive payoff vi. If player i deviates in phase (B) when playerj is being punished, 
and then conforms, he receives at most 
8 vi+1 
(1-a8)  i' 
which is less than iUi  + v'/(1  -  8). If, however, he does not deviate, he receives at 
least 
w(1-8')  6'+1 
W  18  +  (Vi  +  E),  1-8  1-8 
for some  v between 1 and vj. Thus the gain to deviating is at most 
(\  -  1v±1)  __+l 
(11)  1-  +  (8  )  (--  )-  E-8  vw,.  1-6  1-6 
As  8->1,  the  second  term in  (11)  remains finite because  (1-8"+1)/(1-8) 
converges to v +1.  But, because 8" converges to 1, the third converges to negative 
infinity. Thus there exists _i < 1 such that for all 8 > §i, player i will not deviate 
in phase (B) if the discount factor is 8. 
Finally, the argument for why players do not deviate in phase (C) is practically 
the same as that for phase (A).  Q.E.D. 
4.  INCOMPLETE  INFORMATION  WITH  NASH  THREATS 
Suppose that a game is repeated finitely many times, v, that players maximize 
the (expected)  sum of their one-shot payoffs, and that players can observe all 
past one-shot strategies (including mixed strategies). This repeated game can be 
embedded  in  a  v-period sequential game of  incomplete  information. Suppose 
that players' payoffs and, perhaps, even their action spaces Ai depend on their 
types  (although we  shall not explicitly consider this latter type of  incomplete 
information). With probability, say, 1-  E, a given player i is described by gi. We 
call a player of this type "sane" or "rational." However with probability e his 
payoffs and action spaces may be different and might even be period-dependent. 
Such a player we call "crazy." The motivation for suggesting this possibility is 
that often one cannot be sure what kind of player one is up against. One might 
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be  almost sure, but even if  E is nearly zero, one may nevertheless wish to take 
into account other possibilities. Indeed, as the following result shows any vector 
of payoffs Pareto dominating a Nash equilibrium of the constituent game, g, can 
arise approximately17  as the average payoffs of a perfect equilibrium of a game 
of incomplete information18  that, with high probability is just a finitely repeated 
version of g. The result, therefore, is the counterpart for finitely repeated games 
of incomplete information of Friedman's Theorem C above. 
THEOREM  3:  Let  (el,...,  en) be a  Nash  equilibrium  of the game, g,  and let 
(Yi,  *  *, Yn)  =g(el,.  ..,  en). For any 8>0  and any  (V1,.  ..,  Vn)E V* such that 
vi  > yifor all i, there  exists v such that  for any v >  v there  exists a v-period  sequential 
game where, with  probability 1-  E, player i is described in each period by gi and in 
which there exists a sequential equilibrium  where  player i's average payoff is within 
E of vi. 
REMARK:  Notice  that the theorem asserts the  existence  of  a  game  as well 
as  of  an  equilibrium. This  enables  us  to  choose  the  form of  the  incomplete 
information. 
PROOF: As  above,  let  vi =  maxa,...,a, gi(a1,...,  an).  Also  define  v- = 
mina...a,  gi(al,...,an).  Choose  s=(s1,...,Sn)  so  that  g(s1,...,Sn)= 
(V1,  .  * * ,  Vn) 
We will consider a sequential game where each player i can be of two types: 
"sane," in which case his payoffs are described by gi, and "crazy," in which case 
he plays  si  each  period  as long  as  s  has  always been  played  previously  and 
otherwise plays ei. Players initially attach probability E to player i's being crazy 
and probability  1-  E to  i's being sane. We shall see that early enough  in the 
game, both  types  of  player  i play  si if there have been  no  deviations  from s. 
Hence, a deviation from si constitutes an "impossible" event, one for which we 
cannot apply Bayes' rule, and so we must specify players' beliefs about i in such 
an event. We shall suppose that then all players attach probability one to player 
i's being sane. 
Now starting at any point of this sequential game where there has already been 
a deviation from s, it is clear that one sequential equilibrium of the continuation 
game consists of all players playing Nash strategies (the ei's) until the end of the 
game. We shall always select this equilibrium. 
'7The qualification "approximately" is necessary because the game is repeated only finitely more 
times. 
18 Because the game is one of incomplete information, we must use some sort of Bayesian perfect 
equilibrium concept. We shall adopt the sequential equilibrium of Kreps and Wilson [15]. According 
to  this  concept  a player has  probabilistic beliefs  about  other players' types  that are updated in 
Bayesian fashion according to what other players do. An equilibrium is a configuration of strategies 
as functions of players' types such that, at every point of the game, each player's strategy is optimal 
for him, given others strategies and his beliefs about their types (actually the concept is a bit more 
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Choose  v so  that 
(12)  i >max  [m  n-la(x;  ] 
We will show that in a period with  v periods remaining in the game, where 
v  v, a sane player of type i will play si if there have been no deviations from 
s to that point.  If that period he plays something other than si, his maximum 
payoff is vi. Subsequently his payoff is yi every period, since, starting from any 
point-after  a deviation from s, we always select the "Nash" sequential equilibrium. 
Thus, if he deviates from si with  v periods  remaining, an upper bound  to  i's 
payoff for the rest of the game is 
(13)  Di  +(v -l)yj. 
Suppose, on the other hand, he uses the sequential strategy of playing si each 
period until someone deviates from s and thereafter playing ei. In that case, his 
payoff is vi each period for the rest of the game if the other players are all crazy. 
If at least one of the other players is not crazy, the worst that could happen to 
i is that his payoff is vi in the first period and yi in each subsequent period. Now, 
assuming that there have been no previous deviations from s, the probability that 
all the others are crazy is En-.  Hence, a lower bound to i's payoff if he uses this 
sequential strategy is 
(14)  En-1 vv  +(1  -  En-1)(v  + (-l)y). 
From (12),  (14)  is  bigger than  (13).  Hence  all  players  i  will  play  si  in  any 
period at least v periods from the end. Thus, for any E  > 0, we can choose  v big 
enough  so  that  player  i's  average payoff  of  the  v-period  sequential  game  is 
within s  of  vi.  Q.E.D. 
5.  THE  FOLK  THEOREM  IN  FINITELY  REPEATED  GAMES  OF 
INCOMPLETE  INFORMATION 
In this section we strengthen the result of Section 4 by showing roughly that 
any individually rational point can be sustained (approximately) as the average 
equilibrium payoffs of  a finitely repeated game if the number of repetitions is 
large enough. This assertion is not quite true for the same reason that the perfect 
equilibrium counterpart to Theorem A does not hold for three or more players: 
a discontinuity in  V(8)  can occur if the payoff set is degenerate. For this reason 
we confine attention to two-player games.19 
THEOREM  4:  For any  (V1,  V2) E  V* and any E > 0  there exists v such that for 
any v > v there exists a v-period  sequential game such that, with probability 1 -  s, 
'9 If we posited  full dimension we could also establish the result for three or more players; i.e., 
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player i is described in each period by gi and there exists a sequential equilibrium 
where  player i's  average payoff is within e of Vi. 
The proof we provide in this section assumes the existence of a one-shot Nash 
equilibrium that yields both players strictly more than their minimax values. We 
have  established  the  theorem  in  general  using  a  similar but  more  complex 
argument that is presented in our 1985 working paper. 
Briefly, the proof goes  as follows: we know that with an infinite horizon our 
"mutual minimax" strategies of Theorem 1 will enforce any individually rational 
outcome. The problem with a finite horizon is to avoid the familiar "backwards 
unraveling" of these strategies from the end. To do so, we introduce the probability 
E that a player is "crazy" and will punish his opponent for deviations that would 
otherwise be too near the end to be deterred  by credible (i.e., sequentially rational) 
threats. More specifically, we partition the game into three "phases." In the first 
phase,  Phase I, players follow  the strategies of  Theorem 1. That is, they play 
strategies enforcing the desired outcome unless someone deviates, which triggers 
mutual minimaxing for ,3 periods,  followed  by  a return to  the  original path. 
Deviations  during the punishment period restart the mutual punishment. Phase 
II is a transitional phase. Punishments begun in Phase I are continued, if necessary, 
in Phase II, but deviations in Phase II are ignored until Phase III. In Phase III, 
a crazy type plays a Nash equilibrium strategy unless his opponent deviated in 
Phase II, in which case he plays his minimax strategy. Phase III is an "endgame" 
in which the crazy types create punishments that do not unravel, and Phase II 
simply connects this endgame to the strategies of Phase I. The proof shows that 
by making the last two phases long enough we indeed have an equilibrium, and, 
moreover, that the required lengths are independent  of the total length of the 
game. Thus if the game lasts long enough, Phase I constitutes most of the game, 
and our result follows.20 
PROOF:  Let xi = gi(Ml,  M2). Clearly xi < 0. Let (Yl, Y2)  be the expected payoffs 
to a Nash equilibrium (el,  e2) of the one-shot game g, and assume y, and Y2  are 
strictly positive. 
As before,  we  suppose  that players can use correlated mixed strategies. Let 
(Sl, s2)  be correlated strategies yielding payoffs (vl,  v2). Let  3 be an integer such 
that 
(15)  p  max (vii/vi), 
and, as before,  let  vi = minal,a2 g(al,  a2). For given  E  >  , choose  an integer ai 
so that 
(16)  ri3i  + ai(1 -  )yi < aiYi  + vi + 3xi 
and take a = max, ai. 
20  We thank a referee for suggesting this simplified form of our earlier proof. 
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To describe the equilibrium play and the "crazy" player types, we partition 
the game into three "phases." We will number the periods so that the game ends 
in period 1. Phase I runs from period v to period a +  3  +1,  Phase II from (a +  3) 
to a+  1, and Phase III from a  to 1. 
We will specify crazy behavior recursively, that is, in each period we specify 
how the crazy player will behave if play to that point has corresponded to the 
"crazy" play specified for the previous periods, and also how the crazy player 
will respond to any deviation from that behavior. 
Let us begin with Phase I. We define the index  t (t) as follows. Set  t (v) = v +  3. 
In period  t, v -  t >  a +  3, the  crazy type  (of  player  i) plays  si if  It(t)  -  t  /3, and 
M, otherwise. We set  tI(t)=  tI(t+  1) if there was no  deviation from "crazy" 
behavior in period  t +1,  and  tF(t)=  t  otherwise. Thus the crazy type plays  si 
until someone deviates. Deviations trigger 3 periods of minimaxing followed by 
a return to si if there have been no further deviations. Any deviation restarts the 
mutual punishment portion of the sequence, which runs for  3 periods after the 
deviation. 
The crazy type follows the same strategy in Phase II as in Phase I, except that 
deviations  in this phase  do  not  change the  index  t(t).  More specifically,  in 
Phase II,  It(t) =  It(t+  1) regardless of play in period  t+  1, and the crazy type 
plays si if  t (t) -  t  3, and plays Mi otherwise. Deviations in Phase II influence 
behavior in Phase III through a second index variable, 0.  This index has four 
possible values:  0 =0  if there have been no deviations from crazy behavior in 
Phase II;  O = 1 if only player one deviated; 0  = 2 if only player two deviated; 
and 0 = b if both players have deviated. The index 0  is not changed by deviations 
in Phase III. In Phase III the crazy type plays ei if  0  = 0, i, or b, and plays M, 
if  0 =j.  That is, the crazy type of player i punishes his opponent in Phase III 
for having deviated in Phase II unless player i himself also deviated. 
Next  we  describe the  behavior  of  the  "sane" types  of  each  player.  For a 
sequential equilibrium we must specify both a strategy for each player, mapping 
observations into  actions,  and a system of  beliefs,  mapping observations into 
inferences. In Phase I, each sane type's strategy is the same as the corresponding 
crazy strategy. If his opponent  deviates from crazy behavior, the sane player's 
beliefs are unchanged-he  continues to assign the ex ante probabilities of e and 
1-  E, respectively, to his opponent being crazy or sane. 
In  Phase  II,  if,  in  state  0  =0,  a player  deviates  from  crazy behavior,  his 
opponent  attaches probability one to his being crazy. The strategy of the sane 
type (of player i) in Phase II if 6 = 0 or j  is to play as a crazy type. We do not 
specify sane play if 6 = i or b. 
In Phase III, the sane type plays ei if 0  = 0 or j. If player i did not deviate in 
Phase II, then his beliefs  are not changed by play in Phase III. If player i did 
deviate in  Phase II,  and player j  plays  Mj at the beginning of  Phase III, j  is 
revealed to be crazy, while if j plays ej,  j is revealed to be sane. We do not specify 
sane behavior for Phase III if 0  = i or b except to require that it depend on past 
outcomes only through the player's beliefs and 0.  Thus we choose some equili- 
brium for each set of initial beliefs and 0. The exact nature of this behavior and 
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TABLE  I 
Beliefs 
(probability i 
State  Strategies  attaches to j's 
Phase  O  Y(t)  crazy  sane  being crazy) 
I  (periods  v to  -  3+t  Si  Si 
a+,3+1)  -  <  + t  Mi  Mi 
II (periods a +,  0  3> +t  si  i 
to a+1)  0  <,8+t  Mi  Mi 
j  i38+t  si  s  1 
j  <f+t  Mi  Mi  1 
i  >3+t  Si  ?  ? 
i  <,+  t  Mi  ?  ? 
b  >,3+t  Si  ?  ? 
b  <,8+t  Mi  ?  ? 
III (periods a  ei  ei 
to 1)  jMi  ei  1 
i?ei  ?  ? 
b  ei  ?  ? 
the behavior in Phase II if  = i or b is irrelevant for our analysis. We know 
there must exist an equilibrium for each such subgame,21  and, by deriving upper 
bounds  on player i's payoffs there, we will show that these  subgames are not 
reached on the equilibrium path. Thus, regardless of the form of this "endplay," 
there is a sequential equilibrium of the whole  game in which sane types play 
as described in Phase I. The specified behavior and beliefs  are summarized in 
Table I. 
Now  we must show that the specified strategies form a Nash  equilibrium in 
each subgame, and that the beliefs in each period are consistent with Bayes rule. 
We shall consider whether player one's specified behavior is optimal given his 
beliefs and player two's specified behavior. 
We begin in Phase III. If 0 = 0 or 2, player one expects his opponent to play 
the Nash strategy e2 for the duration of the game (recall that if O = 2, player one 
believes player two is crazy), so that the best player one can do is to play his 
Nash strategy e1. 
Now consider some period t in Phase II, i.e., a + ,3 > t > a. First assume O = 0. 
If player one conforms to his specified strategy in Phase II, his payoff each period 
is  either  vu (if  T(t)  -  t  8)  or xi  (if  T(t)-t<83).  Thus his  lowest  possible 
expected payoff for the remainder of Phase II is (t -  a)xl.  If he sticks to specified 
behavior in Phase III as well, he receives ay,.  Thus if player one conforms from 
period t in Phase II onwards he receives at least 
(17)  (t-a)x1+ay,. 
If however player one deviates in Phase II, his highest payoff in that phase is 
(t-a)vl.  Then in Phase III, player two plays  M2 if crazy, and e2 if sane. Thus 
21  To establish this we  can appeal to the existence theorem of  Kreps-Wilson  [15],  since  g is a 
finite game. 
550 FOLK  THEOREM 
an upper bound to player one's expectation in Phase III is (1 -  e)ay1,  and the 
total payoff to deviating in period t of Phase II is at most 
(18)  (t-a)vLl+(1-e)ay1. 
Since t is in Phase II, t -  a < /3, and the equation defining a, (16), ensures that 
deviation is unprofitable. 
If e  = 2 in Phase II, player one is sure that player two is crazy. Thus if player 
one follows  his specified strategy, his payoff is again bounded by (17), while if 
he deviates in period  t his payoff is at most 
(19)  (t-  a)vl  + a · 0. 
Once  more, formula (16)  ensures that  a  is  large enough  so  that deviation  is 
unprofitable. 
Finally consider a period  t in Phase I. From our specification, deviations in 
Phase I do  not  change the players' beliefs  or the value  of  0.  Thus from our 
previous analysis, both players will conform in Phases II and III regardless of 
the play in Phase I, so that any sequence of deviations must end at the start of 
Phase II. 
First assume that  t (t) <p  + t, so that t is part of a "punishment sequence." 
If player one conforms in period t and subsequently, his payoff is 
(20)  (t -  (t)+  3)xi+(t(t)-a  -a-  3)+l  ay1. 
If player one deviates in period t and thereafter conforms, his maximum payoff 
in period t is zero, and he endures the "punishment" of xl for the next  3 periods, 
so his payoff is at most 
(21)  ,3x  +(t  -,  -a-l)vl  +ayl, 
which is less than (20). In particular, player one would never deviate in the last 
period of Phase I, and, by backwards induction, will not wish to deviate in period t. 
Last assume  t(t)  p,  + t, so that player two plays s2 in period t. If player one 
deviates in period  t but conforms thereafter, he receives at most 
(22)  Ui  1+,3x1+(t  -  a -  -  l)uv + ayl. 
If player one conforms to his prescribed strategy, he receives 
(23)  (t-a)v1+ay,. 
The gain to deviating, the difference between (22) and (23), is thus 
(24)  Vl  + ,3x  - (f  + 1)  l. 
Since x,  is nonpositive,  formula (15) defining 83  ensures that (24) is negative, 
so player one will not deviate. Thus the specified strategies are indeed in equili- 
brium. This equilibrium will yield the payoff (Vl, v2) for  v-a-,f  periods,  so 
that by taking  v sufficiently large we can make each player i's average payoff 
arbitrarily near vi.  Q.E.D 
Notice that in the proof of Theorem 3 we not only chose the form of "crazy" 
behavior to suit our needs, but also selected particular conjectures for sane players 
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when  Bayes'  rule  is  inapplicable.  We  should  emphasize  that  our  choice  of 
conjectures was not arbitrary; the theorem is not true if, for example, a player 
believes his opponent to be sane with probability one after a deviation. 
Kreps [12], moreover, has pointed out that, because of our choice of conjec- 
tures, our equilibrium may not be stable in the sense of Kohlberg-Mertens [11].22 
In response, we offer the following  modified version of our construction. This 
version has no zero probability events, so that the issue of the "reasonableness" 
of the conjectures and the stability of the equilibrium do not arise. Specifically, 
assume  that  at each  period  in  Phase  II  a  crazy player plays  as before  with 
probability (1 - ,u),  while  assigning strictly positive  probability to  every other 
pure strategy. If A is sufficiently near zero, the expected payoffs in every subgame 
are essentially unchanged, and our strategies are still in equilibrium. Given that 
the crazy player "trembles" with positive probability in Phase II, any deviation 
in that phase must reveal that the deviator is crazy, as we specified. 
6.  UNOBSERVABLE  MIXED  STRATEGIES 
The  arguments in  Sections  2-5  rely on  mixed  strategies' being  observable. 
Although this assumption is often used, at least implicitly, in the Folk Theorem 
literature and can be justified in some circumstances, the more natural hypothesis 
is that only the moves that players actually make are observed by their opponents. 
In this  section  we  argue that our results continue  to  hold  with unobservable 
mixed strategies. 
We suggested earlier that the only significant use that our proofs make of the 
assumption that mixed  strategies are observable is in supposing that  minimax 
strategies are observable. The heart of the argument, in Theorem 5, therefore, is 
to show that it suffices for other players to observe the realization of a punisher's 
random mixed strategy. 
Although we rule out observation of private mixed strategies, we continue to 
assume, for convenience, that strategies can depend on the outcome of publicly 
observed random variables. We also impose the nondegeneracy assumption of 
Theorem 2. 
THEOREM  5:  Theorem 2  continues to hold when we assume that players can 
observe only the past actions of other  players rather than their mixed strategies. 
PROOF: Choose  s,  (vi,...,  v'),  (V,  .  V  (M1,..  .,  Mn),  and  wJ, i,j= 
1,...,  n as in the proof of Theorem 2. For each i and j, consider MJ, player i's 
minimax strategy against j. This strategy is, in general a randomization among 
the m  pure strategies {a1(k)}Jkll, where we have chosen the indexation so that, 
22  The intuitive basis for Krep's observation is that since the crazy types prefer crazy play, the 
sane types are "more likely" to deviate from it. Of course, in the games as specified this is not strictly 
true, but in the "perturbed" versions of the game considered when testing for stability, there would 
be some deviations that did not increase the opponents's belief that the deviator is crazy. FOLK  THEOREM 
for each k=  1,...,  mi-1, 
gi(ai(k),  Mji)<  gi(ai(k+1),  M^,). 
For each k, let 
p  (k)=  gi(a  (k), M  ) -gi(a  (1), MU ). 
The repeated game strategies we shall consider closely resemble those in the 
proof of Theorem 2. Player i: 
(A)  plays si each period as long as s was played the previous period. If player 
j  deviates from (A), then player i: 
(B)  plays Mi for Vj  periods. 
If player i plays pure strategy ai(k)  in periods tl,...,  tm  of phase (B), define 
m 
rj(k)=  E  8th-lpi(k). 
h=l 
Thus, ri(k)  is the expected  "bonus" that player  i obtains from playing  ai(k) 
rather  than  aL(l)  in those periods. Take ri = Zk  rl(k). Then, rH  is the total expected 
bonus from phase (B). Let 
=  r~(1-8) 
Because (vu,...,  v')  is the interior of  V* and V* has full dimension, there exists 
e > 0 so that, for each j, 
(V  +  -, .  .  .  j_1+  E,  j,  vj+1  +  E,  .  .  .  ,  Vn+  E) 
is in  V*. Since zi tends to zero as 8 tends to 1, we can choose  8 big enough so 
that, for all i and j, zi < E/2. Then 
(25)  (Vl  +-Z,...,  v_-  E  -z  ,  v,,  v,  -J+1.  Z  .,  n +  E -  n) 
is in V*. If player h deviates from the prescribed behavior in phase (B) the phase 
is begun again with j = h. Player i cannot detect whether player h has deviated 
from M-h, but he can observe whether h has deviated from the support of Mjh. 
Accordingly,  if  h  so  deviates,  player i begins  phase  (B)  again with j=  h. Let 
TJ(z) = (T{(z),...,  T-J(z))  be a vector of strategies that realizes the payoffs (25) 
(note that T3(z) depends on the particular realization of pure strategies in phase 
(B)).  Now  suppose that at the conclusion  of phase (B), player i: 
(C)  Plays  T{(z) thereafter, and, if player h deviates from (C), then  i begins 
phase (B) again with j = h. 
The  strategies  Ti  are  chosen  so  that  player  i  will  be  indifferent  among 
all the pure strategies in the support of MJ. The idea is that any expected advantage 
that player i obtains from using ai(k) rather  than ai(i)  in phase (B) is subsequently 
removed in phase (C). Player i then may as well randomize as prescribed by Mi. 
He will not deviate from the support of M\ since such a deviation will be detected 
and punished.  Q.E.D. 
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We can also show that Theorem 1 continues to hold with unobservable mixed 
strategies; we omit the details, except to say that our proof relies on "rewarding" 
a player who uses a "costly" element of his minimax set with a (small) probability 
that play will switch from mutual minimaxing to a static Nash equilibrium. 
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